Commentaries on Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation: One Decade Later by Brilmayer, Lea
HeinOnline -- 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 283 2000
Commentaries on Lea Brilmayer,
Secession and Self-Determination:
A Territorial Interpretation,




There was little reason to think in 1990 that secession might turn out to
be an important topic. Since Secession and Self-Determination was published
in The Yale Journal ofInternational Law, however, the Baltic states left the
Soviet Union and the rest of the Soviet Union crumbled. Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia fractured. Eritrea asserted its independence from Ethiopia
after military success and then a democratic referendum. Quebec's separatist
aspirations from Canada became front page news (along with the comparable
aspirations of various of the indigenous peoples of Quebec). East Timor
succeeded in its drive for independence. Prior to 1990, the only successful
separatist movement had been in Pakistan, where East Pakistan had left to
become Bangladesh. Other separatist movements, such as Biafra's war for
independence, had failed completely.
The events of the last decade have by and large borne out the analysis
offered in that article. The thesis there was that what makes a separatist
movement's claim to independence convincing is the possession of an
historical claim that its territory was wrongfully annexed. Secession, I argued,
is correctly understood as an appropriate remedy for prior illegal annexation.
This analysis was vindicated by the fact that rationales for the successful
separatist movements ofthe 1990s were all articulated in the same terms.
In this respect, the new wave of secessions can be understood as
analogous to the earlier wave of decolonizations in the 1950s and 1960s. That
wave of decolonizations was powered by the modem acknowledgment that
earlier colonial annexations had been morally indefensible. The 1990s showed
that the principle that annexation of some other group's territory is wrongful is
not limited to what was known as "salt water colonialism," meaning colonial
empires that stretched overseas. Whether a conquered territory is treated as a
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colony or annexed to the central portion of an empire, its people have a right
to fight for their freedom. In their fight for freedom, they are called
"secessionists.,,1
The common characteristic of all strong cases for secession is a showing
of illegal annexation. It was the historical record of illegal annexation that
caused us to applaud the newfound independence of the Baltic states, of
Eritrea, and ofEast Timor. Earlier theorists were incorrect in treating the key
determinant to be homogeneity of the conquered people. What matters is not
that it is "a people" who are seeking to be free. What matters is that this
group--whether a homogeneous "people" or not-has a right to a particular
parcel of land, a right that was wrongfully taken from them by a powerful
neighbor.
It is important to ask how this obvious point might be overlooked. How
could international lawyers and theorists have spent so many years assuming
that the key point was ethnic, religious, or linguistic homogeneity rather than a
history ofwrongful annexation? When a group seeks to set up a new state on a
particular piece ofland, how could it not matter whether the group had a good
territorial claim to the piece ofland? In suggesting an answer to this question,
I want to suggest that the failure to recognize this obvious point may be more
general. The same odd blindness infects most Western discussions of
"nationalism," to which similar misunderstandings pertain. It is caused by
ignorance and by unwillingness to try to understand the moral claims of
people with whom we do not identify-for reasons of differences of
geographic location, race, religion, or culture.
In evaluating secessionist claims specifically, there are two different
aspects of the claim on which one might focus. Traditionally, theorists had
focused on the cohesiveness of the group asserting the claim-whether the
group in question was a distinct "people" in the religious, linguistic, or ethnic
sense. There is another issue at stake, however: the objective validity of the
claim that the particular group espouses. Thus (as I argued ten years ago) the
claim to a particular piece of territory will be more or less convincin~
depending on the existence (or nonexistence) of a historical claim to land.
Regardless of the identity of the group making the claim, the claim itself
might be more or less persuasive, depending on historical fact, legal
reasoning, moral argumentation, and so forth.
Similarly, but more generally, nationalist claims potentially have two
different aspects to investigate. One might focus on the identity of the group
1. It is reveaIing that most "secessionists" reject the tenn. They typically claim that they are
not seeking secession, but recognition of an independent state that existed all along. They argue that as
the annexation oftheir territory was illegal, it was null and void. Thus they deny that they are trying to
alter the existing territorial borders of the larger state. Instead, they claim, they are trying to preserve
territorial borders as they always existed in the past.
2. In theory, there might be other bases for a claim to land. One might claim that one's group
is entitled to a piece of land because it was given by God, for instance, or because one had a right to
annex sufficient farm land to become food self sufficient. However, in practice, the kinds of claims to
territory that we recognize are historical ones, and most groups that make territorial claims phrase these
in terms ofhistorical right.
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asserting the claim and find it morally significant that the claim in question is
being asserted by a distinct national group (poles, Armenians, Serbs, or East
Timorese). Instead, however, one might ask whether the claim in question is
objectively justified regardless of the nature of the group that asserts it.
Claims that a particular national group is entitled to something are not
necessarily dependent normatively on the fact that it is a national group that is
making the claim. Indeed, I would argue, they typically do not.
The standard interpretation of nationalist claims is that they are saying:
"My nation, right or wrong." The assumption is that nationalist claims are not
based on anything more intelligent than a desire that one's nation prevail. But
nationalists typically do not mean to be making such a claim. Instead, they are
typically saying: "My nation, because it is in the right." Of course, there is
always the chance that the person is wrong because his or her nation is
actually not in the right. But this is no more true for claims made by nations
than for claims made by individual people. The fact that a person is claiming
something that he or she is not entitled to means that he or she is making an
unwarranted claim. It does not mean that he or she is not attempting to rely on
arguments about right and wrong.
The fact that a claim is being asserted on behalf of one's nation is not
thought, in and of itself, to give one a justification for advancing the claim.
The nationalist essentially admits that it is theoretically possible that the claim
might be unjustified, even while he or she believes sincerely and deeply that
the facts and argument on which the claim is based are in fact correct. The
nationalist is not claiming that so long as he or she acts on behalfofhis or her
nation, no justification is needed. The nationalist simply feels that an adequate
justification exists.
The erroneous interpretation ofnationalist claims as being all of the sort
"my nation, right or wrong" has two consequences. First, this
misunderstanding obscures whatever real justification might exist (or be
thought to exist by the national group) for the claim in question. The outside
observer has no reason, or need, to take seriously the moral or legal argument
that the nationalist wishes to advance. This misunderstanding thereby relieves
the outside observer of any need to become acquainted with the facts or
arguments of the parties to the dispute. Discussion in the outside world
becomes a highly relativistic account of "what the Serbs want" or "what the
Croats think they stand to gain." Once argument is reduced to this level, there
can be no right and wrong. One nationalistic argument is as good or bad as
any other.
Second, this misunderstanding gives nationalistic claims a pervasively
negative connotation. Nationalist claims are bad because the essence of the
claim is exclusionary. One wants something for one's own group, regardless
of whether that group has any entitlement, and one's own group is defined in
intrinsically ascriptive and illiberal terms. Nationalism smacks of racism,
xenophobia, and bigotry.
With no genuine moral issue in sight-and with the atavistic reputation
that "nationalism" has come to possess-the rest of the world dismisses real
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disputes, over serious matters, as "tribal" (if such disputes arise between black
people) or "ethnic" (if they arise between whites). Regardless of where they
arise, there is no need to take them seriously. They are bloody, primitive, and
childlike. The West watches smugly.
Dismissing a position as "nationalistic" is essentially an ad hominem
form of argument. The characterization distracts attention from the merits or
demerits of the underlying claim. Dismissing claims to independence as
"secessionist" is a particular application of this false and condescending logic.
There truly are rights and wrongs in international relations, and the linguistic,
ethnic, or religious homogeneity of the group asserting a claim has little, if
anything, to do with whether a particular claim is right or wrong. The West
takes seriously its own claims to what is right and what is wrong. It should
take the claims ofthe rest ofthe world, and in particular the developing world,
just as seriously.
